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Over twenty years ago Hepworth (1953) hypothesized that firms might use the
flexibility allowed by accounting principles and techniques to reduce the ampli-
tude of periodic net income fluctuations - in other words to "smooth" net income.
Hepworth and various other researchers suggested several reasons why smoothing
behavior would be beneficial to managers. The first empirical investigation
concerning smoothing actions by management was conducted by Gordon, Horwitz and
Meyers (1966). Since that time numerous empirical tests of the income smoothing,
hypothesis have been conducted, based on various assumptions, and achieving various
degrees of conclusiveness.
The purpose of this paper is a) to review the methodology used in past
empirical studies of income smoothing with the goal of highlighting the procedures
used to operationalize the concept of smoothing, and b) to empirically investigate
the extent to which results of smoothing studies may vary depending on the manner
in which smoothing is operationalized.
BACKGROUND
Smoothing Defined
Smoothing can be defined as the adjustment of reported income figures with the
purpose of reducing the periodic fluctuations in that series. Smoothing
may be accomplished by either artificial means (selection or use of accounting
procedures which do not require a real economic transaction) or real means (engaging
in a transaction that has real economic consequences). Furthermore smoothing may
be "visible," in the sense that management's actions are disclosed (e.g., the choice
of the deferral vs flowthrough method of recording the investment tax credit) or
"1
While artificial and real smoothing are (conceptually) distinct, empirically the
effects of artificial and real smoothing may be difficult to isolate. Whether or
not to engage in a transaction and how that transaction will be recorded may be a
concurrent decision on the part of a firm's management. (Dascher & Malcolm, 1969)
invisible (e.g., revision of the useful life estimate for a depreciable asset).
Smoothing research was first pursued in an attempt to explain what motivates
management's selection and use of alternative accounting procedures (Gordon, Horwitz
& Meyers, 1966). Ideally, two firms with identical economic situations should issue
identical financial statements. However, there exists sufficient choice among
accounting alternatives (e.g., straight line vs accelerated depreciation) and
sufficient flexibility in applying accounting procedures (e.g., subjective estimates
of fixed assets' useful lives) that the income reported by two "identical" firms coulc
differ substantially and still be in accordance with generally accepted accounting
principles. Consequently, income as reported in financial statements is at least
partly a function of the manner in which management uses the discretion allowed by
currently accepted accounting principles. Given that accounting principles are
sufficiently flexible to present management with the opportunity to "adjust" reportec
income, what determines how management will use that capability?
In an attempt to explain management choice, several authors (Beidleman, 1973;
Gagnon, 1967; Gordon, 1964; Hepworth, 1953; Monsen and Downs, 1965) argue that a
primary goal of managers is to report a .steadily increasing series of earnings
2
over successive periods (i.e., to smooth income). Furthermore, Kane (1973)
hypothesizes that managers are even willing to sacrifice real profits for the mere
appearance of stability or low variability in the reported earnings series. Many
arguments why managers may be motivated to smooth income have been suggested (for
a further discussion, see appendix I). Most arguments claim that managers act
in their own self-interest, and that the reporting of an earnings series characteri;id
by low variability will effect the behavior of various groups (owners, creditors,
investors, government, employees) in a manner which is ultimately beneficial to
2
Alternative goals of management have also been hypothesized. The traditional
hypothesis of management behavior is that managers will attempt to maximize
reported earnings (Gagnon, 1967). Baumol (1958) however suggests that managers
will try to maximize sales, not earnings. Simon (1957) sees managers as
satisficers rather than maximizers.
nanagement.
s
With smoothing as a hypothesized goal of management several questions become
3f interest. Do managers actively attempt and succeed in smoothing income? Are
artificial or real techniques (or both) employed? Are artificial techniques
jerceived as artificial by the users of accounting information? Does smoothing
3
iffect the behavior of users? Does smoothing affect a firm's systematic or
4
msystematic risk? Does smoothing affect the price of a firm's stock? Does
imoothing prove beneficial to managers? Are resources more (or less) efficiently
illocated if income numbers are smoothed?
One particular group whose actions are of interest to accountants is investors -
as represented in the aggregate by the securities market reaction to accounting
information. From the point of view of the effect of smoothing on securities
prices, artificial smoothing may be of little interest. The efficient markets
hypothesis suggest that artificial smoothing will have no effect (assuming there
is sufficient disclosure to detect it). From the point of view of investigating
management behavior and goals, artificial smoothing still remains of interest.
Recent evidence (Mayer-Sommer , 1979) suggest that the understanding and acceptance
of the efficient markets hypothesis is not wide spread. Artificial smoothing may
be practiced under the (erroneous) assumption that it makes a difference. Further-
more while the securities market may be assumed to be efficient with respect to
artificial smoothing techniques, whether or not other users of accounting information
(e.g., creditors, labor) can be affected by artificial smoothing remains an open
question. Real smoothing, on the other hand, would be expected to impact on
securities prices and this area remains open for investigation.
Biedleman (1973) has argued that smoothing may be practiced in an attempt to
"counter the cyclical nature of reported earnings and thereby reduce the
correlation of a firm's expected returns with returns on the market portfolio. To
the degree that autonormalization of earnings is successful and that the reduced
covariance of returns with the market is recognized by investors and incorporated
into their valuation processes, smoothing will have added beneficial effects on
share values." (p. 654) The results of Lev and Kunitzky (1974) suggest that the
smoothness of earnings are correlated with both systematic and overall common stock
risk measures.
A goal of accounting is to provide information that is useful for predicting the
future cash flows of a firm (FASB, 1973). Resource allocation in the securities
market is based on share prices. Share prices are based on investor assessment
of the value of the firm which is contingent on expected future cash flows. To
the extent that accounting numbers are used and affect investor predictions of
cash flows, income smoothing has implications for resource allocation. Recent
work (Barnea, Ronen & Sadan, 1976; Ronen, Sadan & Snow, 1977) argues a motivation
for smoothing may be to provide investors with an income stream that is efficient
in predicting future cash flows. If smoothing does provide a more efficient signal,
enhanced predictability could lead to a lowered risk assessment and a beneficial
effect on share prices. In this respect artificial smoothing (as well as real)
could have content for the market - not because it reflects a real transaction,
but because it constitutes a signal about future cash flows (Horwitz, 1977).
Numerous empirical studies of smoothing have been conducted (see Ronen,
Sadan, and Snow, 1977, for a summary). Both artificial and real smoothing has been
investigated. Yet while the smoothing hypothesis was first articulated over twenty
years ago, research has not progressed much past addressing the question of whether
smoothing appears to be practiced. Research has not fully addressed the effects of
smoothing behavior - whether or not smoothing (artificial or real) makes a difference,
and to whom. A major reason for not examining smoothing effects has been the
difficulty of operationalizing the concept of smoothing. A premise of this paper is
that the possible impact of smoothing cannot reasonably be investigated until the
concept of smoothing becomes adequately defined operationally. The next section of thi
paper reviews how smoothing has been operationalized in past empirical studies. The
remainder of the study investigates how some of the methodological assumptions and
techniques that have been employed in operationalizing smoothing may effect the results
of smoothing studies.
Past Empirical Studies
The past studies have all followed a similar research process (Figure 1) . All
were expos t studies and included the following steps:
1. .A smoothing technique(s) or instrument (s) was hypothesized. For
example, Gordon, Horwitz, and Meyers (1966) suggested that the choice of
the accounting treatment for the investment tax credit (flow through vs.
deferral) might be made with an attempt to smooth income. Several
researchers have argued what they feel are the necessary attributes of a
smoothing instrument (Beidleman, 1973; Copeland, 1968; Cushing, 1969;
Gagnon, 1967; White, 1970). Generally a smoothing instrument must be
some accounting procedure choice, some management decision which takes
advantage of the flexibility allowed by an accounting system, or some
actual transaction, which is within management's discretion and shifts income
between reporting periods.
2. An income measure was identified. Most studies have looked at the
Net Income or EPS measure, while some have looked at Ordinary Income
(Barnea, Ronen, Sadan, 1976; Ronen & Sadan, 1975).
3. A sample of firms was selected and published financial data on income
and on the smoothing instrument was collected.
A. A methodology was developed in order to investigate the impact of
the smoothing instrument on the variability of the income measure.
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6. Finns were classified as "smoothers" if the smoothing instrument
tended to reduce income variability and "non-smoothers" if income
variability was increased. General conclusions were drawn about the
incidence of smoothing behavior based on the relative proportion of
firms classified as smoother or non-smoothers.
Past studies have primarily asked if smoothing is practiced. They have not
as yet answered the question of whether smoothing has an effect, but ultimately,
if smoothing is practiced, its economic impact needs to be investigated and some
past studies have indicated impact research as being the next step.
Past Methodologies
While the general research process is similar among the smoothing studies,
the specific methodologies have differed. Basically three separate choices were
made (either explicitly or implicitly) by past researchers:
1. Choice of target income .
2. Choice of smoothing instrument norm .
3. Choice of design type .
Target Income . Researchers face a problem in answering the following
question: If managers do attempt to smooth income, toward what target income are
they aiming? What income pattern do they desire to achieve? Smoothing implies a
dampening of fluctuations in reported income. The question of a target is
methodologically important because researchers have analyzed the fluctuations in
income by measuring the variability of reported income relative to some target.
Researchers have been forced to hypothesize a target or a pattern of income which
they assume firms desire to achieve. Firms have been classified as smoothers (or
non-smoothers) on the basis of the variability of their reported income series
relative to the target. Consequently the classification of firms is necessarily
dependent on the target assumed. While various theories of the firm, theories of
management behavior, and theories of how reported earnings affect stock prices exist,
they have not provided smoothing researchers with a definitive target or income pattei
toward which managers might be expected to adjust income.
Different researchers have used different criteria for defining a target income
6
[lumber. Some early studies (Archibald, 1967; Copeland, 1968; Copeland & Licastro,
L968; Gagnon, 1967) simply assumed that firms would attempt to replicate the
prior year's income. Thus, if income was above last year, managers would attempt
:o smooth downward, and vice versa. A recent study (Ball & Watts, 1972)
Lndicated ex post facto that the previous year's income may in fact be the best
starting point for prediction of net income, but no evidence has surfaced which
Indicates that managers merely attempt to duplicate the previous year's income.
'raiseworthy management performance is usually considered to include a bettering
>f the previous year's performance, thus an argument can be made that management
;ould aim for a target above previous years' income.
Various other researchers have used time related models to set target
figures. Gordon et al. (1966) and Cushing (1969) developed their own measures
lefining target income by an arbitrary weighting of several prior years' income.
Jarefield and Comiskey (1972), Barnea et al. (1976), Beidleman (1973), and
ftiite (1970) all used least squares regression lines to predict target income.
[Tie income predicted by the regression line fit. to the actual stream of income
ras assumed ex post to be the target toward which firms attempted to smooth. Still
Jthers, including Beidleman (1973) and Dascher and Malcom (1970) have used semi-
Logarithmic and exponential models to generate targets. Ronen and Sadan (1975) used
i submartingale model which predicts target income primarily on the basis of the
>revious year's income. Models using the reported income of other firms have also
>een used to generate targets. For example Barnea, Ronen, & Sadan (1976) assumed
:hat firms in a given industry would try to duplicate the pattern of income exhibited
>y the "leading firm" in that industry. While Ronen and Sadan (1975), assumed that
firms would try to follow the income pattern exhibited by an aggregate index of income
»f all firms in a given industry.
Defining target income has been an important step in past studies, yet the
|ustif ication for using various models has been intuitive rather than theory-based.
Smoothing researchers have agreed on one thing: that smoothing implies a dampening
of fluctuations of reported income. And they have analyzed the fluctuations in
income by measuring variability relative to some target. But there has been little
agreement on what target, and therefore problems in operationalizing the concept
of variability.
Smoothing Instrument Norm . Smoothing is usually viewed as the adjustment
of income through the use of some discretionary choice by management. For
example a firm could attempt to adjust income upward by spending less for R & D
in a given year and adjust downward by spending more for R & D in another year.
The question for the smoothing researcher is how much of the R&D expense is to
be considered discretionary? If the researcher assumes that a zero level of R & D
expense is the "norm", then he will use the full amount of R & D expense reported
in any given year as the appropriate quantity to use in assessing the impact of
R & D on income variability. Alternatively, the researcher could assume that some
average level of R & D expense (over a period of years) is normal. In that case
the portion of R & D that a firms management has discretion over would be
represented by deviations from the average; and those deviations would be the
appropriate quantities for the smoothing researcher to use in assessing the impact
of R & -D on income variability. Most smoothing researchers have implicitly
assumed a zero norm. Some have assumed an average (Barnea, Ronen, & Sadan, 1976).
Other norms have also been used. For example, Ronen & Sadan (1975), while
investigating the smoothing effects of extraordinary items, assumed that extra-
ordinary items for a firm would follow the aggregate pattern of extraordinary
items exhibited by the firm's industry as a whole. Thus deviations from the
industry pattern were the measure used to assess the effect of extraordinary items
on income variability. Regardless of the norm assumed, deviations from that norm
have been treated as the quantities whose impact on earnings was assessed.
6
It should be noted that the issue of a smoothing instrument norm is not always
relevant. Some research has looked at the smoothing consequences of the choice
between two accounting alternatives - e.g. flowthrough vs. deferred methods of
treating the investment tax credit. Where such a choice between two discrete
alternatives is investigated, the issue of a norm is moot. However when the
smoothing consequences of an instrument that can vary continuously across a range
is investigated, a norm must be implicitly or explicitly assumed.
8
Design . As has been previously stated, the empirical research of the smoothing
question has been of the ex post type using financial data from published sources.
The design is a process which takes the raw data on both income and the smoothing
instrument for an individual firm and, taking into consideration the assumed
target and norm, reduces the raw data in some manner which indicates whether or
not the particular firm appears to have smoothed its recorded income. The designs
which have been used in past studies are of three basic types: a) cross-sectional,
b) regression - standard error, and c) regression - correlation.
Within the cross-sectional (CS) design, the reported income number (s) from
the preceding year(s) are used to predict or set a target for the year that is
being investigated. Then, if the effect of the smoothing instrument was to move
the actual reported income closer to the target than would have been the case
if the smoothing instrument had not been present, the firm is classified as a
smoother (and vice versa) . The essence of the cross-sectional design is that
the target is a function of the preceding year(s) reported income, that a target
is set for each year that is being investigated, and that each year - is treated
separately as an individual observation.
The regression - standard error design, on the other hand, treats several
years of income figures for each firm as a single observation. Generally a stream
of income for several years is detrended using one of many possible target income
patterns. For example if the researcher assumes that firms desire to achieve a
smooth linear time trend in reported income, then the reported income series could
be regressed against time and the residuals calculated. The trend line is
assumed to be the target and the residuals are analyzed to assess variability
relative to the target.
The regression - standard error design follows from Gordon (1966) who
suggested a possible test for income smoothing:
For each firm, fit a curve to a stream of income over several years
calculated in two ways: (1) excluding the effects of the possible
manipulative variable; and (2) including the effects of the manipu-
lative variable. If the variations of the observations around the
curve are smaller in the latter case, income smoothing has been a
consequence of transactions in the account. (p. 223)
The essence of the Gordon approach is that it focuses on two series of income
(with and without the smoothing instrument included) and compares the variability
of the two income series. The standard error of the estimate (SDE) is frequently
used to measure variability about the trend line, hence this approach can be
termed the regression - standard error design (RS)
.
The regression - correlation (RC) design was first used by Beidleman (1973)
.
The RC design also considers several years of income figures for each firm as a
single observation. Beidleman detrended the reported income series (using some
target pattern) and detrended the smoothing instrument series (using some norm)
.
Residuals from the two series were associated via correlation to determine if
smoothing had occurred. For example, if a firm attempted to smooth income via
research and development expense, one would expect to observe above normal R&D
expense in years in which there was above target income. Thus a positive
correlation between R&D expense residuals and income residuals would be
consistent with smoothing behavior. The essence of the RC design is that it
focuses on one income series and one smoothing instrument series, rather than two
income series. (Details of how particular targets, norms and designs are
operationalized will be elaborated on in a later section of this paper.)
Background Surjnary .
It is clear from the research process employed that the findings of past
Other measures of variability about the trend line could and have been used.
For example Barefield and Comiskey (1972) used the mean square error. The
SDE has been used more frequently, however. All studies which use this basic
approach of comparing the variability of the two income streams are referred
to as RS designs in this paper.
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studies are at least in part a function of the choices made by the researchers.
The targets and norms assumed and the designs used have varied from study to
study (Table 1). Any attempt to view past empirical studies as a coherent body
of research - and consequently be able to draw conclusions on the incidence of
smoothing behavior and begin to investigate its impact - is necessarily based
on an assumption that the past studies are all testing the same phenomenon, and
that the different methodologies used are merely different ways of operationalizing
the construct of smoothing. However, if different methodologies result in
significantly different findings (using the same raw data) then one must conclude
that the findings are a result of the methodologies used. Just as beauty is in
the eyes of the beholder, smoothing may be in the methodology used to investigate
it. Ronen, Sadan and Snow (1977) have previously suggested that smoothing
studies may be affected by the target models used. The results of White's study
(1970) seem to reinforce this idea. But a systematic look at the effects of
different methodologies has not been conducted.
The remainder of this paper reports on a study which looks at the effect
of the methodology used in smoothing research on the findings of the research. A
research process analogous to that outlined in figure 2 was followed: A potential
smoothing instrument was identified. An income measure was selected. A target
and a smoothing instrument norm were assumed. A choice of design was made.
Smoothing measures were generated and firms were classified as smoothers or non-
smoothers. The process was systematically repeated numerous times under several
assumed targets, several assumed norms, and different designs. The findings under
the varying assumptions and procedures were compared. The basic research question
underlying the study was:
What is the effect of target selection, norm selection, and design selection
on the findings of smoothing research?
11
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NATURE OF THE CURRENT STUDY
The Smoothing Instrument - Marketable Securities Transactions
Prior to FASB No. 12, most firms recorded the value of marketable securities
at cost, although some firms used the lower-of-cost-or market rule. The AICPA
stated that
Where market value is less than cost by a substantial amount and it is
evident that the decline in market value is not due to a mere temporary
condition, the amount (of marketable securities) to be included as a
current asset should not exceed market value .... (Accounting Research
and Terminology Bulletins, Final Edition; 1961, p. 23)
(FASB No. 12 now requires the use of lower-of-cost-or market for valuing
marketable securities which reduces but does not eliminate the smoothing potential
of securities transactions.)
The result of recording marketable securities at cost is that when market
prices increase significantly above cost values, a firm in effect builds up a
reserve which can be realized as revenue through the sale of the securities.
Management can determine the period in which the gain will be reported. If firms
desire to smooth reported income, securities can be held or sold on the basis of
the resultant effect on reported income. The period in which the value of a
given security changes need not coincide with the period in which that change in
value is realized and included in the calculation of net income. The cost basis
of recording and the recognition of revenue at the time of sale allow management
a certain flexibility in revenue realization. Consequently, revenue from the
appreciation of marketable securities is discretionary in nature and a potential
smoothing technique.
The decision to investigate marketable securities transactions as a potential
smoothing instrument is based on several considerations:
1. As just discussed, there is strong a priori reason to believe that
marketable securities transactions have smoothing potential. (See also
Kane, 1973.)
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2. In addition to a priori arguments of smoothing potential, there is
empirical evidence that "the cost basis (of recording marketable securities)
does result in the creation of reserves which might be used to influence
reported income" (Dopuch & Drake, 1966).
3. A decision to sell securities involves a real transaction. Past research
has investigated both "real" smoothing (where a real transaction is involved)
and "artificial" smoothing (where only an accounting entry is involved with
no cash flow consequences). Most empirical research into smoothing has looked
at artificial smoothing, but the more conclusive empirical results have
tended to follow from investigations of real smoothing (Beidleman, 1973;
Dascher & Malcom, 1969). This is interesting in light of another study
(Lev & Kunitsky, 1974) which showed an association between real smoothing of
a firms income and the market risk of that firm's stock.
The real versus artificial distinction is also important with respect
to the efficient markets hypothesis which suggests that an attempt to
smooth income by artificial means will have no effect on stock prices
(assuming sufficient information in the public domain to deduce the effects
of the artificial smoothing technique on reported income numbers)
.
A, As previously mentioned, the issue of assuming a smoothing instrument
norm is not relevant to the testing of all smoothing instruments. The level
of gains and losses resulting from marketable securities transactions, however,
can vary over some continuous range; and consequently a norm must be assumed.
Because a norm must be assumed, the effect of assuming different norms can
be investigated.
5. The primary accounting effect of a decision to sell securities (i.e.
recognition of a gain or loss) impacts income for one year only. Some
previous studies have been criticized because decisions which affected income
for several years were investigated, but the impact of those decisions on all
years effected was not assessed. Because gains or losses from securities
transactions effect income for one year only, the methodological problem of
trying to. assess multiple-year consequences of the decision is avoided.
8
Data Base
The commercial banking industry was deemed an appropriate area in which to
test for income smoothing via marketable securities gains and losses. The banking
industry was selected for several reasons: (a) it was believed that substantially
all firms in the banking industry hold marketable securities and consequently a
8
It can be argued that the selling of a security results in the sacrifice of
interest or dividends in future periods. However, evidence (Kane, 1973) suggests
that within the banking industry the secondary effect of future interest or
dividends is of relatively little concern in a decision to sell securities
compared to the recognition of gains or losses. The recognition of a gain or
loss is discretionary on the pnrt of managers while the recording of future
interest or dividends is beyond their immediate control.
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sufficiently large sample of firms could be developed; (b) a preliminary perusal
of annual reports of commercial banks indicated that gains and losses from
security transactions were sufficiently material as to be of some importance;
and (c) there is substantial a priori reason to believe that banks may attempt to
smooth income via security transactions (see Kane, 1973).
A list of banks was generated from Fortune'
s
list of the 50 largest commercial
banking firms. A sample of 40 firms was selected. (Original data gathering for
this study was completed while the author was a student at SDSU. Selection of
the 40 firms was based on the availability of annual reports at SDSU. See appendix
II for a listing of sample firms.)
Annual reports were accessed to collect data on two series: (a) reported Net
9
Income and (b) Gains and Losses from marketable securities transactions. Data on
reported net income and gains and losses from securities transactions was collected
for the five year period 1970-1974. This period was considered appropriate to
investigate because (1) a change in the tax law applicable to security gains and
losses occurred in 1969. Prior to 1969 gains and losses were taxes- at different
rates resulting in a "penalty" to firms that offset gains and losses in the same
tax year. The changed tax law gave banks more flexibility in engaging in
securities transactions for smoothing purposes (Kane, 1973). (2) FASB No. 12,
restricting the accounting treatment of securities gains and losses, became
effective December 1975. Thus 1970-74 embraces the period when the smoothing
potential of securities transactions for banks was relatively high.
Target Income
Six different targets were looked at, each involving a different assumption
9
Measures of Ordinary Income or Operating Income, used in other studies, were
considered irrelevant because Gains and Losses from securities transactions are
not added into Ordinary or Operating Income in the banking industry.
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about the pattern or level of income desired by managers. (The targets are
operationalized differently depending on the design used. Operationalizing the
targets is discussed in a later section of this paper.) The assumptions
underlying each of the six targets are as follows:
1. Linear Time Trend . Target 1 assumes that managers desire a pattern
of income that has low variability relative to a linear time trend.
2. Industry Trend . Target 2 assumes that firms desire a pattern of income
which approximates the pattern exhibited by the industry as a whole.
Variability is measured relative to an industry trend line.
3. Leader Trend . Target 3 assumes that firms desire a pattern of income
which approximates the pattern exhibited by the industry leader. The
industry leader is used as a surrogate for the industry as a whole.
4. Preceding Year's Earnings . Target A assumes that firms attempt to
replicate the preceding year's reported earnings figure.
5. SYD Growth . Target 5 assumes that firms attempt to meet a target based
on the preceding year's reported income plus a growth factor. The growth
factor is based on a sum-of-the-years-digits weighting of growth over
several prior periods.
6. Average Growth . Target 6 assumes that firms attempt to meet a target
based on the preceeding year's reported income plus a growth factor equal
to the average growth over several prior periods.
Smoothing Instrument Norm
As previously discussed a normal level for the smoothing instrument (gains
and losses from securities transactions) must be assumed. It is the deviations
from the norm which are considered to be discretionary and consequently it is
the deviations whose effect on reported income is important. Four different
norms were investigated:
1. Zero . Norm 1 is zero and thus assumes that the full amount of reported
gains or losses from securities transactions in any given year is discretionar
2. Average . Norm 2 is the average level of gains and losses reported for
the 5 year period of the study. Deviations from this average are assumed to
be the discretionary portion of gains and losses.
3. Linear Time Trend . Norm 3 assumes that gains and losses follow a linear
time trend. The norm for any given year is the amount predicted by a trend
line fit to the 5 year gains and losses series. Deviations from the trend
16
are considered discretionary.
A. Industry Trend . Norm 4 assumes that gains and losses for an individual
firm follow the same pattern as an industrywide index of gains and losses.
Deviations from such an industrywide trend are treated as discretionary.
_ . 10
Designs
Ultimately the function of the different types of designs discussed in this
paper is to take the raw data on income and securities transactions for an
individual firm and, taking into consideration the assumed target and norm, reduce
that raw data to some "smoothing" measure which indicates whether or not the
particular firm appears to have smoothed its reported income. In this study a
smoothing measure was developed for each of the three designs. The measures
developed are designed to reflect the "impact" of gains and losses from
securities transactions on income variability. Impact here means the relative
decrease (increase) in income variability due to the effect of gains and losses
from securities transactions, or the strength of association between gains and
losses and net income. The three measures developed and used in this study have
the following properties:
a) Each reflects the effect of the smoothing instrument on income
variability.
b) Each is similar to measures used in the smoothing literature.
c) Each takes on positive values when smoothing behavior is indicated and
negative values when non-smoothing behavior is indicated. The
classification of firms as smoothers (non-smoothers) follows directly
from the sign of the smoothing measure.
The following sections discuss how the three smoothing measures were developed
from the three designs, as well as how the various targets and norms were
operationalized under each design. All targets were not investigated under each
design. A summary of which targets and norms were investigated under each of the
designs follows the design discussion.
Some limitations of the designs used in this paper are presented in appendix III.
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Cross-sectional Design (CS ) As previously discussed, the cross-sectional
type designs used in past smoothing studies focus on the effect of the smoothing
instrument on income for one year. The most recent year from the data, 197A, was
investigated. The smoothing measure was developed as follows:
Define:
Y = actual reported net income for a given firm for 1974.
T = target income hypothesized for 1974.
S = actual reported gains or losses from securities transaction for 1974.
N - the norm for securities gains and losses hypothesized for 1974.
D » S - N = the deviation of the reported gains and losses from the
hypothesized norm.
Y" - Y - D = reported net income with the effects of the discretionary
portion of gains and losses removed, henceforth called presmoothed
income.
The smoothing measure used was
T - Y
The meaning of this measure can best be explained by example. Assume a firm's
target income (T) was $100. Assume that its actual income figure (Y) was $104.
If securities transactions (S) resulted in a loss of $2 and all of that loss was
assumed discretionary (i.e. norm (N) = 0) then presmoothed income (Y") would have
equaled $106. The smoothing measure calculates the extent to which the
discretionary portion of securities gains and losses (S) moves income (Y) closer
to the target (T) than would have been the case if gains and losses from securitie
transactions was not present. | 100 - 106 | - | 100 - 104 | = 2 i.e. the effect of
securities transactions was to shift reported income $2 closer to the target.
Conceptually this represents the change in the deviation of actual income from
target income due to the effects of the smoothing instrument.
Targets used in the cross-sectional design were developed for each firm
individually as follows:
T = The income predicted for 1974 by a least squares linear regression line





where M is an industry index of reported net income calculated by
adding the net incomes of all firms in the sample (excluding the
individual firm whose target is being generated)
.
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where L is the actual reported net income of the industry leader
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N~ = the value predicted for 1974 by a least squares linear regression
line fit to the 1970-1974 series of S for each firm individually.
N, = the S series for each firm was regressed (using least squares linear
regression) against an industry index of securities gains and losses
(calculated by adding the gains and losses in each year for all firms
in the sample excluding the individual firm under consideration) . The
value predicted for 1974 by the regression equation was assumed to be
the norm.
Each combination of a design, a target and a norm will be referred to as a model
Each of the six targets were combined with each of the four norms. Thus 24
cross-sectional models were developed and a smoothing measure was generated for
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each of the 40 sample firms using each model.
Regression - Standard Error Design. The following procedure was followed
in arriving at a smoothing measure for the RS design:
Define:
Y the actual reported income series (1970-1974) for an individual firm
T =» the target income series (i.e. the pattern of income hypothesized to
be the target)
S = the actual reported securities gains and losses series (1970-1974)
for an individual firm.
Y' » Y - S = presmoothed income series (1970-1974)
Steps:
a) Y was regressed against T (using ordinary least squares linear regression).
The standard error of the estimate was computed (SDEL,)
b) Y" was regressed against T. The standard error was computed. (SDEL^)
c) The smoothing measure was calculated as SDEL.^ - SDEL,.
The interpretation of this measure is analogous to the interpretation of the cross-
sectional measure. It represents the improvement in variability due to the effects
of the smoothing instrument.
Targets were operationalized as follows:
T = the series 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. (i.e. a constant linear time trend was the
assumed target pattern.)
T = an industry income series calculated by summing the reported net incomes
each year for all firms in the sample (excluding the firm whose target
pattern is being set).
T_ = the reported income series for the industry leader (Bank of America)
.
Norms were operationalized as follows:
N
1
= a constant (zero)
N
2
= a constant: (5^ + S^ + S1972 + S^ + S ig7Q ) * 5
N_ = the series 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.
N, = an industry series of gains and losses from securities transactions
(calculated by summing the gains and losses for all sample firms for
each year - excluding the individual firm being investigated)
.
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All combinations of Che three targets and four norms just outlined were tested
under the RS design, for a total of 12 models.
Regression - Correlation Design . The following procedure was used in
arriving at a smoothing measure for the RC design.
Define:
Y = the actual reported income series (1970-1974) for an individual firm.
T = the target income series
S = the actual reported securities gains and losses series (1970-1974) for
an individual firm.
N = the series of gains and losses hypothesized to be the norm.
Steps:
a) Y was regressed against T using ordinary least squares regression.
The residuals were calculated. (Designated series ^,)
b) S was regressed against N. The residuals were calculated.
(Designated R )
c) "Ry, was correlated with R .
d) The resulting correlation was multiplied by -1.
This correlation was used as the smoothing measure. The implicit argument is
that if smoothing is practiced then above trend (norm) securities gains and
losses will be associated with below trend (target) income, and vice versa.
Thus smoothing behavior would be consistent with a negative correlation between
residuals. The higher the negative correlation, the stronger the smoothing
association indicated. The correlation was multiplied by negative one to make
its sign consistent with the smoothing measures developed under the other designs
Targets were operationalized as follows:
T. = the series 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.
T_ = an industry income series (calculated analogously to T under the
RS design)
T. = the reported income series for the industry leader, Bank of America.
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Norms were operationalized as follows:
N a constant (zero)
N
2
- a constant: (S197A
+ S^ + S ig?2 + S^ + S^) * 5
N. = the series 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.
N, an industry series of gains and losses from securities transactions
(calculated by summing the gains and losses for each year for each
sample firm - excluding the individual firm being investigated) .
All combinations of the three targets and four norms just outlined were tested
-
under the regression - correlation design, for a total of 12 models.
Table 2 summarizes the combinations of targets, norms and designs investigated,
Some targets were not tested under the RS and RC designs because investigation of
those targets would have required income data prior to 1970 which was unavailable
at the time the data collection phase of this research was conducted.
Comparison of Models . As Table 2 indicates a total of 48 different models
were investigated. Each model generated a smoothing measure for each of the 40
sample firms. Thus each firm was classified as a smoother or non-smoother using
each model. Several questions were then addressed.
1) Do different models lead to different classification of firms as smoothers
or non-smoothers?
2) If different models do lead to different classifications, what choice
(selection of target, norm or design) is most critical in inducing different
classifications?
3) Which specific targets, norms or designs cause models to classify firms
differently than the remaining targets, norms or designs? (More specifically,
can targets, norms, or designs which are "outliers" be identified? For
example does the use of norm No. 1 in a model lead to classifications which
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DESIGNS CS - Cross-sectional
RS - Regression - SDE
RC - Regression - Correlation
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ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
Do Different Models Lead to Different Classifications ?
The classification of sample firms as smoothers or non-smoothers generated
under each model was compared with the classification generated under every
other model. This resulted in 1128 pairwise comparisons of models. A









Cell A would contain the number of firms which were classified as smoothers by
both model i and model j. Cell D would contain the number of firms classified
as non-smoothers by both models. Cells B and C would contain the firms
classified as a smoother on one model and a non-smoother on the other. If two
models classified firms similarly then one would expect most of the 40 firms to
fall into cells A and D. A high number of observations in cells A and D relative
to cells B and C would suggest a high association between the two models. An
observation in either cell B or C represents a change in how a firm was classified
(as a smoother or non-smoother) with a change in the model. The average number of;
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classification changes over the 1128 pairwise comparisons was 14. 9. The median
number of classification changes was 15.7. The number of classification changes
ranged from zero (perfect association between models) to 26 (poor association
between models).
The significance of the association between any two models can be tested
by a chi-square test. A chi-square test of association assumes no association
between models. The null hypothesis of no association can be rejected for
significantly high chi-square values. The expectation was that if different
models resulted in substantially the same classification of sample firms, then
large (significant) chi-square values would be observed. Poor association
between models would be indicated by low chi-square values. All comparison
involved 40 observations and df = 1.
Of the 1128 pairwise comparisons 277 (24.6%) resulted in chi-square values
in excess of 6.635 which is significant at the c\ = .01 level. Thus the null
hypothesis of no significant association was rejected for 277 comparisons.
The null hypothesis failed to be rejected for the remaining 851 (75.4%) cases.
These findings suggest that there is substantial disagreement among the models
in classifying firms as smoothers or non-smoothers. A way to interpret these
results is to assume that a researcher had selected (randomly) one of the 48
models developed in this study, and assume that he switched (randomly) to some
other model. The probability that the two models produced significantly
similar classifications of firms as smoothers or non-smoothers would be about
1 in 4.
What is the Critical Researcher Choice ?
The results just described suggest that there is the possibility of
substantial disagreement among models if the researcher changes his assumed target,
assumed norm, or design type. The question of which of these three choices is
25
more likely to effect the classification of firms was addressed next.
The 1128 pairwise comparisons were broken into three subsets: those which
resulted in a chi-square value in excess of 6.635 (<=* .01) were termed the
"high" association group (277 cases). Those that resulted In a chi-square value
of less than 3.841 (°< = .05) were termed the "low" association group (759 cases).
Those whose chi-square values fell between 3.841 and 6.635 were termed borderline
and dropped from subsequent analysis (92 cases).
Discriminant analysis (Tatsuoka, 1970) was used to analyze and distinguish
between those pairwise comparisons which were in the highly associated group
and those in the low group. More specifically, a discriminant function was
developed as follows:
Z B, D + B n T + B, N + B. DT + B c DN + B, TN + B^ DTN12 3 4 5 o 7
WHERE
Z Discriminant score
B. = the standardized coefficients of the corresponding variables (weights)
D = a dummy variable with value of +1 if the two models being compared
differ in their design type and if they use the same design
T 1 if the models differ in targets and if the models assume the
same target
N = 1 if the models differ in norm and if the models assume the same norm
DT = 1 if the models differ in both design and target, otherwise
DN = 1 if the models differ in both design and norm, otherwise
TN = 1 if the models differ in both target and norm, otherwise
DTN = 1 if the models differ in design, target and norm, otherwise.
A discriminant function is a linear combination of the independent (discriminating
variables. The purpose of discriminant analysis is to find the particular
function that maximally discriminates between groups. An analysis of the
coefficients of the discriminating variables can then be used to address the
question of which variables contribute most to the separation between the
26
two groups. -1-1
In the current context, the observation that a particular discriminating
variable contributes to separation of the groups means that the difference in
models represented by that variable was important in determining whether the
two models being compared would be of high or low association. For example
if variable T was found to contribute significantly to group separation, then
one would conclude that whether or not two models differed in their assumed
targets is important in determining whether or not those two model's are highly
associated, i.e., classify firms in a similar manner.
A hierarchical stepwise procedure (SPSS, 1975) was used in developing the
12
discriminant function. Variables D, T and N were allowed to enter the
discriminant function first in order of their capacity to discriminate between
the high and low groups. Variables DT, DN and TN were allowed to enter after
D, T and N if they provided additional information about group differences.
Variable DTN was allowed to enter only if it provided information about group
differences not already contained in'D, T, N, DT, DN, or TN. Table, 3 shows
the results of the discriminant analysis. Five of the seven variables were
found to contribute to group discrimination. The standardized coefficients
(ignoring signs) are frequently interpreted as a measure of the relative
importance of each variable in explaining group differences (SPSS, 1975). Recent
work (Joy & Tollefson, 1975) has suggested that the standardized discriminant
TT
In theory discriminant analysis requires that the discriminating variables
have a multivariate normal distribution and that there be equal variance -
covariance matrices within each group. Those conditions are not met here but
the findings are still believed useful both because the discriminant technique
is robust and because subsequent analysis tended to produce findings which are
consistent with those from the discriminant technique.
12
Two alternative entry criteria, Wilks and Rao (SPSS, 1975), were used and found
to produce the same results. A hierarchical stepwise procedure was used because
of high multicolinearity between the primary variables D, T, N and the various






















Canonical correlation = 0.517
Wilks ' Lambda - 0.7325
Chi square (measure of significance of Wilks 1 lambda) = 321.03
Chi square value significant at^= .001
Z of cases correctly classified 80.12%
28
coefficients are not the best measure of contribution, and that are more
relevant measure can be calculated by multiplying the unstandardized coefficients
by the difference between group centroids for each variable. This measure of
contribution is also presented in table 3.
Several findings are suggested by table 3. The discriminant function
resulted in a Wilks lamda value which was significant at the °( = .001 level.
Thus the function does have explanatory significance. Knowledge of the
characteristics of the two models in each pairwise comparison would have
permitted accurate classification of the comparison (high or low association)
about 80% of the time.
The presence of variables D, T and N in the function suggests that a change
in' a model's design, target or norm may be sufficient to produce a significantly
different classification of firms as smoothers or non-smoothers. Thus all three
researcher choices are important.
More significantly for the purposes of the current study, is that a
critical choice seems apparent. On both measures of relative contribution,
variable D is dominant and should be considered of primary importance in
development of a smoothing model. Of secondary importance, variable N appears to
contribute more to group discrimination than variable T. This suggests that
models may be more sensitive to a shift in the assumed norm than in the assumed
target.
Are Specific Designs, Target or Norms "Outliers" ?
The third question to be addressed asked if specific designs (or targets or
norms) appear to result in smoothing/non-smoothing classifications which are
different from the classifications generated from models using other designs (or
targets or norms). The rationale behind this question is that of convergent
validity (Kerlinger, 1973). Ultimately a researcher would desire to have a
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model which reproduces "reality". In other words the model would classify a
firm as a smoother (non-smoother) if and only if the firm was in truth a smoother
(non-smoother). Agreement with reality would be the test of validity of the
model. Since ex post smoothing researchers have no true classifications with
which to validate models, an alternative concept of validity seems appropriate.
Convergence argues that if several different procedures for measuring some
attribute lead to similar results, then the similarity of results is evidence
that the different procedures are validly measuring the desired attribute.
Within the present context, this suggests that if some specific design, target
or norm leads to results which differ from those produced when other designs,
targets or norms are used, then the validity of that specific design, target or
norm is placed in doubt.
Designs : Since the choice of design was found to be more critical than the
choice of target or norm, designs were investigated first. All pairwise model
comparison where the models differed in design type were isolated. This
resulted in 677 pairwise comparisons between models that differed in design.
As there were only three possible designs (CS, RS, RC) , three types of design
comparisons resulted: CS/RS, CS/RC, RS/RC. Each of these comparisons could
result in models which were higly or lowly associated (i.e. fell into the high
or low groups previously defined on the basis of chi-square scores). Table 4
is a contingency table which relates the nature of the design comparison with
the level of association achieved.
Table 4
Contingency table showing the relationship between the types of designs









The significance of the relationship presented in table 4 was tested using a
chi-square test of association (df » 2). The resultant chi-square value of
561.2 was significant at oK - .0001. Cramer's V (SPSS, 1975), a measure of
association which can take on values from to +1 was .91. Clearly there is
an association between the type of designs compared and the resultant observation
that the models were or were not highly associated. The findings are relatively
clear. The classifications of firms as smoothers or non-smoothers
produced by the CS design are poorly associated with the classifications produced
by both the RS and RC designs, while the RS and RC designs produce classifications
that tend to be well associated with each other.
The results presented in table 4 involve comparisons of models which may
differ in target and norm as well as design. To control for differences in
targets or norms, the above process was repeated for those model comparisons where
designs differed but targets and norms were the same (35 cases). The results
13
are presented in table 5 and confirm the previous findings: the CS design
tends to produce classifications which differ from those produced with the RS or
RC designs.
Table 5
Contingency table showing the relationship between the type of designs
present in model comparisons and the level of model association achieved.









significance <=< = .0001
Cramers V = 1.0
13 While an analysis which controls for differences in targets or norms is
theoretically more correct, controlling for confounding variables reduces
sample size which intensifies a small cell size problem and causes chi-square
values to be less meaningful. In this and later sections of the paper findings
under both uncontrolled and controlled conditions are presented because they
tend to confirm each other and because small cell sizes are more frequently
observed under the controlled conditions.
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Norms . As the assumption of a norm was previously found to be the second
most important choice, the association between models assuming different norms
was investigated next. Because design types were seen to have a significant
effect on firm classification, norms were investigated separately within the
context of each of the three designs. Table 6 presents contingency tables
relating the types of norm present in model comparisons with the level of model
association achieved. (All models used the CS design.) The left hand side of
table 6 ignores target differences. The right hand side controls for target
differences by displaying only those cases where the models being compared have
identical assumed targets.
Both sides of table 6 tell essentially the same story. Chi-square values
are significant suggesting that there is a relationship between the type of
norms compared and the resultant observation that the models were or were not
highly associated. Cases of low association predominate when models assuming
a linear norm (N3) are compared with models assuming any of the other norms.
This result is particularly noticeable when targets are controlled for. Thus
norm 3 appears to be an outlier when used in the CS type design.
Another finding is also suggested by table 6. Whether or not target
differences are controlled, the column totals indicate that, overall, cases of
low association far outnumber cases of high association. Apparently even when
all models use the same (CS) design, there exists considerable disagreement on
how they classify firms. Models using the CS design are quite sensitive to a
change in norm. Furthermore, a comparison between the column totals found under
uncontrolled conditions with those found under controlled conditions indicates a
14
significantly larger number of low association cases when targets are not
controlled. Thus if two CS models differ in target as well as norm, there exists
14
A t test for the significance of difference between two sample proportions
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a higher probability that they will be poorly associated.
Tables 7 and 8 present a similar analysis of norm differences within the
context of the RS and RC designs respectively. Within both designs, there was
no significant relationship between the type of norms compared and the level
of association achieved. No outliers are strongly indicated. In fact when
target differences were controlled for, there were no cases of low association
between models. The column totals suggest that models using the RS and RC
designs are considerably less sensitive to changes in the norm assumed than
are models using the CS design.
Targets . Lastly target comparisons were investigated - again separately
for each design. Six different targets were assumed under the CS design. Taken
pairwise there are 15 combinations of targets which can be compared. Table 9
presents contingency tables relating target comparisons with the level of model
association achieved (with and without control for norm differences between
models) « Without control for norm differences the relationship between target
comparisons and level of association is just significant ato(= .05, but no
clear pattern of agreement or disagreement between targets is apparent.
Controlling for norm differences reveals that there is a relationship
between targets and level of association, although further interpretation is
difficult. A comparison of models tended to result in low association when T3
was present in the comparison (i.e. when one of the models assumed a target
based on the industry leader.) However this was clearly not the case for all
comparisons involving a T3 model, thus it does not appear safe to conclude that
T3 is an outlier.
A more interesting result is indicated by a comparison of the column totals
between the controlled and uncontrolled conditions. The fact that a) there were
relatively few cases of low model association when norms were controlled and that
36
TABLE 9
CONTINGENCY TABLE SHOWING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TYPE OF TARGETS PRESENT
IN MODEL COMPARISONS AND THE LEVEL OF MODEL ASSOCIATION ACHIEVED
(CS DESIGN)








































































CHI SQUARE - 24.00
SIGNIFICANCE o< = .046
CRAMER'S V - 0.34
CHI SQUARE - 50.99
SIGNIFICANCE o< - .0001
CRAMER'S V = 0.71
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TABLE 10
CONTINGENCY TABLES SHOWING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TYPE OF TARGETS PRESENT IN
MODEL COMPARISONS AND THE LEVEL OF MODEL ASSOCIATION ACHIEVED
(RS DESIGN)
\
NORMS NOT CONTROLLED (a = 40) NORMS CONTROLLED (n = 12)






















SIGNIFICANCE <* = 0.14
CRAMER'S V - 0.31
CHI SQUARE =2.18
SIGNIFICANCE o< 0.34
CRAMER'S V - 0.42
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. TABLE 11
CONTINGENCY TABLES SHOWING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TYPE OF TARGET PRESENT IN
MODEL COMPARISONS AND THE LEVEL OF MODEL ASSOCIATION ACHIEVED
(RC DESIGN)
NORMS NOT CONTROLLED (n = 45) NORMS CONTROLLED (n = 12)


























SIGNIFICANCE <* = 0.30
CRAMER'S V = 0.23
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b) a significantly larger proportion of low association cases are observed
when norms are not controlled suggests that models differing in both norm and
targets are more likely to be poorly associated and that norm differences may
be more important than target differences. This finding is consistent chat
provided by the discriminant analysis and table 6.
Tables 10 and 11 present a similar analysis of targets within the context
of the RS and RC designs. Since only three targets (Tl, T2, T3) were investigated
under the RS and RC designs, only three comparisons were possible (T1/T2,
T1/T3, T2/T3). Within both designs there was no significant relationship between
the type of targets compared and the level of association achieved. In fact,
with the exception of one case, when norm differences were controlled for, there
were no cases of low association between models. The column totals indicate
that models using the RS and RC designs are less sensitive to a change in the
assumed target than are models using the CS design.
SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS
This paper has attempted to do two things: 1) to review the research
process used to research income smoothing, and 2) to empirically address some
issues concerning the role of model selection in influencing the findings of
past smoothing research.
The review suggested that ex post smoothing researchers have made three
choices: a) selection of an income target toward which firms are assumed to
smooth, b) selection of a smoothing instrument norm which determines the portion
of the smoothing instrument assumed to be discretionary; and c) selection of a
design which operationalizes the concept of smoothing and generates a classificat If:
15 A t-test for the significance of difference between two sample proportions
(Richmond, 1964) was significant ato( = .001.
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of firms as smoothers or non-smoothers. While target selection has been
discussed in previous work (Ronen, Sadan & Snow, 1977) and design issues have
been addressed throughout the smoothing literature, the role of norm selection
has not been previously highlighted. Norms have often been implicitly assumed
without justification in previous work. This is important because the
empirical portion of this study suggests that the selection of a norm may be
a more critical choice on the part of a researcher than selection of a target.
The empirical portion of this paper investigated the effect of the choice -
of targets, norms and designs on the findings of smoothing research. Three
questions were addressed: 1) Do models which differ in target, norm or design
lead to different results? 2) Which researcher choice is most critical? 3) Are
there specific targets, norms or designs which appear to be "outliers"?
Several conclusions are suggested: First, there seems to be no doubt that
different models can lead to significantly different classifications of firms
and consequently different results. For over 75% of the pairwise comparisons
between models investigated in this study, the finding was that the- models were
not significantly associated. The 75% figure may overstate the case but it
seems clear that the findings of smoothing research are significantly dependent
on the models assumed.
Second, while the choice of a target, norm or design can all influence
results, the selection of a design type appears to be the most critical decision
smoothing researchers have made.
Third, the results generated from models using the CS design differ
substantially from the results generated from the RS or RC designs. The RS and
RC designs tend to generate results that are well associated with each other.
16
There were more CS than RS or RC models involved in the analysis. This coupled
with the fact that 1 ) CS models were poorly associated with RS or RC models, and
2) CS models were more sensitive to changes in targets or norms suggests that the
75% overstates the case.
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Fourth, the selection of target or norm appears to be more important in
conjunction with the CS design than either the RS or RC designs. A change of
assumed target or norm was most likely to result in low association between
models if those models used a CS design. The CS design appears more sensitive
than the RS or RC designs to changes in target or norm.
The conclusions of this study must be tempered with several limitations.
The empirical portion of the study was conducted within a narrow context. One
specific industry was sampled (commercial banking) . One specific smoothing
instrument was investigated (securities transactions). One specific income
measure was selected (net income as reported in published financial statements)
.
And only one specific five year period was involved (1970-74). In some respects
this paper is analogous to a case study. The effect of using different models
was investigated within one particular environment. Furthermore, this
investigation did not encompass all models that have been used in past research.
In spite of the limitations just mentioned, there seem to be two important
implications for viewing past research or conducting future ex post research
on smoothing.
First, a smoothing model needs more than face validity for there to be
confidence in the results it generates. The models used in past smoothing
studies have generally had high face validity, yet the results of this study
show that alternative (superficially valid) models can lead to significantly
different results. Future research should make a greater effort to tie model
selection to theory, or should make an effort to validate models using some
notion of convergent validity.
Second, the fact that there was such clear disagreement between the CS
and the RS or RC type models raises the question of whether they are investigating
the same aspect of the smoothing phenomenon. A short review of how the designs
operationalized the construct of smoothing provides some insight. Generally
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the CS design used income data from prior years (1970-73) to predict a target
income figure for 1974. If the effect of the smoothing instrument was to
move actual reported income closer to the target than it would have been in
the absence of the smoothing instrument, the firm was classified as a smoother.
In other words the firm is classified on the basis of its apparent attempt to
achieve a target in one year.
Both the RS and RC designs made no predictions. They merely detrended
an income series and evaluated the ex post effect of the smoothing instrument -
on income variability. Thus when using the RS or RC design, the firm is
classified on the basis of its apparent achievement of lowered income
variability.
Two different aspects of smoothing may be being investigated. If one
accepts that smoothing is a multi year phenomenon (I.e. , reducing the variability
of a series of income figures) then the CS design seems to ask the question
"Do firms appear to try to smooth income?", while the RS and RC designs seem
to ask the question "Do firms appear to succeed in smoothing income?" If
future research is concerned with the behavioral question of whether smoothing
is attempted, a cross-sectional design might be appropriate. If future research
is concerned with the accomplishment of a smoothed income series, then an RS or
RC design would be more appropriate. In any event, past research should be
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HYPOTHESIZED BENEFITS OF SMOOTHING BEHAVIOR
1. Tax Benefits . If tax rates change from year to year, it is to managements
benefit to shift income to years in which the tax rate is relatively lower. If
management compensation is tied to company profits and management experiences a
progressive tax structure, then the smoothing of income will result in a lower
overall personal tax being paid (Hepworth, 1953)
.
2. Dividend Policy . Stable earnings facilitates a stable dividend policy. Stable
dividends will increase investor satisfaction with management (Hepworth, 1953) . If
management policy call for a fixed level of dividend payout, a less variable income
allows that fixed level to be high (Ronen, Sadan and Snow, 1977).
3. Industrial Relations . Abnormally high profits may lead to strong demands on
the part of labor for wage increases. Abnormally low profits, however, will seldom
lead to wage decreases. Consequently, it is beneficial to management to avoid
excessively profitable years by smoothing income (Hepworth, 1953).
4. Market Psychology . Psychological factors are an important element in the
determination of overall economic activity. Smoothing income could control the
expectations of business participants and reduce the effect of excessive optimism
or excessive pessimism on the level of business activity. Thus smoothing would
result in an improved overall better business climate (Hepworth, 1953).
5. Performance Measurement . Income is used as a measure of management performance.
Excessively poor years may lead to stockholders rebellion and management ouster
while excessively good years don't usually lead to corresponding rewards. There is
an asymmetry between the results of failure and success (Johnson, 1966; Monsen and
Downs, 1965).
6. Stockholder Utility . Stockholders have diminishing marginal utility for
corporate income. Smoothing income leads to higher overall utility on the part of
stockholders (Gordon, 1964).
7. Public Image . A smoothed income stream serves to create a public image of
competence and also avoids controversy (Monsen & Downs, 1965). Such stability and
lack of controversy would be beneficial in not arousing regulatory interest.
8. Budgeting . Income numbers are used to develop budgets and plans. The smoothing
of income can prevent vacilating targets (Beidleman, 1973).
9. Earnings Prediction . Generally accepted accounting principles do not allow
for forecasts. Managers may attempt to smooth income so as to provide users with
a more efficient tool for predicting future earnings (Barnea, Ronen, Sadan; 1975).
10. Creditor Relations . Creditors look at income variability in determining the
riskiness of a loan. A smoothed income stream could lead to lower interest rates
or an increased ability of a firm to obtain credit.
11. Stock Price . Managers have a direct interest in stock prices (compensation,
stock options) as well as an indirect interest (ease of raising capital, stockholder
satisfaction). Capital market theory claims that risk and return are related. More
specifically as the risk (variability) of a given asset increases, investors require
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higher expected return. High market risk (as measured by beta) may be associated
with lower price/earnings ratios (Monsen & Downs, 1965). Accounting income numbers
have been shown to have information content for the market (Ball & Brown, 1968) .
And measures of variability in accounting income numbers have been shown to be
related to market risk (Lev & Kunitsky, 1974; Beaver & Manegold, 1975; Beaver,
Kettler, & Scholes, 1970). It can be argued that investors incorporate the fact
that an income stream is smooth into their valuation process and that consequently
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METHODOLOGICAL WEAKNESSES OF EX POST STUDIES
\
All empirical studies must make some assumptions and face some limitations
in design. Any study has individual weaknesses, but more important are
limitations shared by studies as a group. Three limitations tended to
characterize the cross-sectional design studies;
1. By looking at each year as an individual observation there exists
the possibility of confusing maximizing behavior with smoothing behavior
(see Copeland, 1968, for an elaboration). Studies by Archibald (1967),
Copeland and Licastro (1968), Cushing (1969), Dopuch and Drake (1966),
Gagnon (1967), Gordon, Horwitz and Meyers (1966), and White (1970) all
encountered this problem.
2* Some smoothing instruments previously investigated have involved a
decision on the part of firms which committed the firm to future action.
For example, the decision to use deferral rather than flow through for
the investment tax credit commits the firm to an allocation procedure
which effects income for several years. It is conceivable than an
instrument that has a smoothing effect in one year could have a counter-
smoothing effect in subsequent years.
This does not mean that hypothesized smoothing instruments or
decisions which have multi-year consequences cannot be used to smooth
income. It does mean that if a technique results in a future commitment
on the part of management, then the effect of that technique on the
future periods should be investigated. This was not done by Gordon,
Horwitz and Meyers; Gagnon; Archibald; White; or Cushing.
3. Some past studies classified firms as smoothers or non-smoothers by
investigating only the direction of the effect of a hypothesized smoothing
instrument on income (i.e., increases or decreases). Failure to consider
the magnitude of the effect on income could lead to mis-classification.
(See Cushing, 1969 for an elaboration.)
Most of the more recent studies (Barefield and Comiskey, 1972; Beidleman,
1973; Dascher and Malcom, 1970; Barnea, Ronen and Sadan, 1976; Ronen and Sadan,
1975) have adopted one of the two regression designs. Regression designs overcome
the problem of possible misclassif ication inherent in the cross-sectional design
and by their very nature consider the magnitude of the effect of the smoothing
instrument investigated as well as the direction of the effect. There are however
some assumptions and limitations associated with the regression design:
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1. If one of the strengths of the regression type design is that it
looks at multi-year data as one observation, it is also a potential
weakness. Researchers must ask the question of how many years of
income figures should be investigated. Studies by Copeland (1968) and
Dascher and Malcom (1970) have indicated that investigations of streams
of income of different length can result in different conclusions. What
length of time period (if any) is optimal for identifying firms which
smooth income? Copeland suggests that lengthening the time period looked
at will decrease the chance of mis-classifying firms as smoothers or
non-smoothers. Yet Copeland' s research had numerous design weaknesses
which make the results suspect. The issue of the proper length of time
to investigate is unresolved.
2. Some models that have been used are incompatible with some of the data.
For example, Dascher & Malcom used an exponential detrending model and
Beidleman used a logarithmic model. Both models have some intuitive
appeal because they are consistent with the idea that firms may desire to
increase their level of growth each year. Yet both models are inconsistent
with decreasing trends in earnings and both studies had to discard
observations where firms showed declining trends. This becomes a problem
when it is noted that White (1970) concluded that firms experiencing declining
trends in earnings may be the most likely to engage in smoothing activity.
3. Target models have been used by researchers which are inconsistent with
the stochastic properties of income numbers. Linear, exponential, market
index, industry leader trends have all been used to detrend income streams.
Yet research by Ball & Watts (1972) suggests that income streams
may best be described by a martingale or submartingale process. Ball &
Watts even argue that because of the martingale nature of income numbers
attempts by firms to smooth income may result in variability being increased.
Gonedes (1972), however, has questioned this conclusion and has outlined the
circumstances under which smoothing behavior may prove beneficial.
The implicit assumption of regression designs which use time to detrend
earnings is that the expectation of income is a function of time. As Ball
& Watts state, this implies that unexpected increases (or decreases) in
earnings are temporary and thus should be smoothed away. The martingale
nature of income streams however, suggest that such is not the case.
Relatively good times do not necessarily follow bad times (and vice versa)
so smoothing may be counter productive.
Shank & Burnell (1974), however, have provided evidence that in
practice managers strive for a consistent time trend in income. As smoothing
is a behavioral phenomena on the part of managers, models which involve
trends consistent with income patterns that managers might desire to
achieve seem plausible for research purposes.
Before proceeding, two inherent limitations of all ex post type smoothing
studies whether cross-sectional or regression type in design, should be mentioned:
1. Ex post studies based on published accounting information are
necessarily limited to "visible" smoothing techniques while perhaps the
most effective smoothing techniques are those that are invisible to the
researcher (e.g., expense vs. capitalization policies).
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2. As many researchers (Cagnon, 1967; Kirchheimer, 1968; Schiff, 1968;
Zeff, 1966) have noted there are limitations to the conclusions that can
be drawn from ex post studies. Published data is at best a reflection of
the underlying decision making and motivation of managers. An ex post
indication that the use of a potential smoothing technique has resulted
in decreased income variability does not "explain" management behavior.
The fact that management consciously acted to smooth income can not be
concluded. Such results can only indicate that management behaved as_ ^f_
it attempted to smooth income. No motivational connection can be proved
(Barnea, Ronen & Sadan, 1976, p. 112). Ex post studies can only talk about
appearances, not behaviorial fact.
This issue has relevance for the present study. The argument in
looking at marketable securities transactions is not that banks will engage
in securities transactions with smoothing as the only relevant consideration,
There are no doubt many factors that enter into a decision to trade a
security. An ex post analysis can not isolate the effect of the individual
factors considered. The argument is, however, that smoothing may be one
consideration. An ex post study is a first cut at trying to determine if
smoothing is practiced. If the results are such that the effect of
securities transactions is to reduce income variability for a significant
proportion of sample firms then one can conclude that smoothing behavior
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